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Abstract 
 
Public good attributes that are correlated with protest beliefs but not separable from the good's 
value, would affect stated preference estimates of the WTP for the public good.  Survey data 
collected to value a program to prevent ecosystem losses on Nevada rangelands, where the 
majority of land is publicly owned and managed, reveal more than half of the respondents 
exhibiting some protest belief. Of these, about 60% voted 'yes' to some nonzero bid amount. By 
treating protest beliefs and opposition to the proposed program as separate concepts, we 
systematically analyze their determinants and impacts on WTP.  In this framework, people with 
protest beliefs may or may not vote 'no' to all bids and people may, without being protesters, 
answer 'no' to all dollar amounts. Multinomial logit regression results suggest that factors 
motivating people to protest and/or oppose the proposed program are so diverse that a single 
model does not provide a good fit. We estimate nested models and conclude that different 
underlying processes determine WTP for "protesters" ($34.02) and "non-protesters" ($69.56). 
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Willingness to Pay Estimation When Protest Beliefs are Not Separable from the Public 
Good Definition 
 
By Kimberly Rollins, M.D.R. Evans, Mimako Kobayashi, and Anita Castledine 
 
Introduction 
Protest responses to stated preference questions have traditionally been treated as outliers to 
be identified and eliminated from data collected to estimate willingness to pay (WTP).  The 
earliest literature identified a protest response as a ‘no’ to an extremely low dollar amount, or a 
‘yes’ to an extremely high amount.  However, in some circumstances a ‘no’ response to a very 
low bid, including $0, is not necessarily a protest response, but a genuine indication of a zero or 
negative WTP (or willingness to accept compensation).  The use of sets of follow-up questions 
asking respondents why they voted ‘no’ has became standard practice to identify respondents 
who hold protest beliefs as opposed to genuine ‘no’ responses.  These questions typically query 
the respondent about (a) their attitudes toward the payment vehicle (e.g. “I am opposed to new 
taxes”), (b) paying for a public good (“somebody else should pay” or “I don’t believe in placing 
a dollar value on this good”), (c) trust in the agency or organization that would hypothetically 
provide the good (“I don’t trust the government to use my contribution for the intended 
purpose”), and (d) other beliefs that affect the likelihood of a ‘no’ response but that are 
associated less with their preferences for the good itself than with the methods that are used to 
elicit preferences. 
Standardization of a set of protest questions and protocol has not occurred, in part because 
the non-market goods and payment vehicles used in preference elicitation are highly variable.  
As an alternative to adopting a standard protocol, some authors advocate using open-ended 
questions identify protest responses (Bateman et al. 1999).  Dziegielewska and Mendelsohn 
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(2007) propose a method that combines several approaches to identify protestors: they identify 
protesters as respondents who (a) vote ‘no’ to all dichotomous choice bid amounts, (b) indicate a 
$0 WTP on open-ended follow-up questions, and also (c) hold protest beliefs.  The majority of 
the published literature in this area is similarly concerned with methods to identify protest 
responses in order to justify eliminating outliers from an analysis. 
However, a number of authors point out that, in identifying protesters solely for the purpose 
of deleting outliers, we lose information that is important for non-market valuation as well as 
compromising our capacity to make inferences to the general population.  Jorgensen and Syme 
(2000) illustrate that interdependence among the types of beliefs that people hold can lead to 
biased WTP estimates if observations from respondents with one type of belief are deleted from 
an analysis but those of the other type are not deleted.  They show that some people who are 
willing to pay also hold protest beliefs, but would not be identified as protest respondents if the 
criteria included voting ‘no’ to all dollar amounts.  They conclude that a more thorough analysis 
of protest beliefs and interdependencies among beliefs held by respondents is necessary for 
achieving a consistent method of identifying and treating protesters in an analysis. 
Furthermore, we claim that in many circumstances public goods have attributes that are not 
easily separable from the flows and services provided such as program delivery and financing, 
but that are correlated with protest beliefs such as opposition to new taxes or distrust of 
government.  In these cases, survey designs may be limited in their ability to control for 
attributes that trigger protest responses.  If people with protest beliefs define the good in question 
differently from non-protesters, then the underlying preferences and the distributions for WTP 
may also be different, therefore making the WTP estimates difficult to interpret.  In these 
circumstances, a large proportion of the population may exhibit protest beliefs.  Eliminating 
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protest responses would result in loss of policy relevant information, while using both protesters’ 
and non-protesters’ WTP estimates would lead to better informed policy decisions. 
In this paper, we use survey data collected to value a program to prevent further ecosystem 
losses from invasive species and wildfire on Great Basin rangelands in Nevada, where the vast 
majority of the land is publicly owned and managed.  Historically there has been tension between 
the private citizens and the federal land management agencies.  It is therefore not surprising that 
more than half of the respondents exhibited some protest belief.  Given that the payment vehicle 
for the proposed program was taxation and that the most popular protest reasons were distrust of 
government and weariness of paying taxes, we hypothesize that many of those with protest 
beliefs likely evaluated, instead of a pure ecosystem, a composite good “ecosystem managed by 
a public agency.”  Appropriate definition of protest is especially important for this dataset 
because, of those with protest beliefs, about 60% voted ‘yes’ to some non-zero bid amount.  As a 
result, if we were to apply the conventional protest definition, we would throw out more than a 
fifth of the survey responses from the analysis as outliers, while pooling those with protest 
beliefs and those without.  If that is the case, WTP estimates for a pooled sample would be 
biased downward and would not be appropriate to use as society’s valuation of the ecosystem. 
Meyerhoff and Liebe (2006) focus on explaining the underlying motives for protest beliefs 
held by respondents to contingent valuation questionnaires.  They use six questions for all 
respondents, not just people who voted ‘no’ for all dollar amounts, to identify protest 
respondents, distinguish among types of protest beliefs, and analyze how protest beliefs 
influence the decision to pay and the amount that protesters are willing to pay to support a public 
program.  Respondents indicate agreement or disagreement on a 5-point Likert scale, from which 
a protest index is constructed.  They use the protest index as the dependent variable in a 
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regression with demographic, attitudinal and economic variables as predictors to identify 
motivations for protest beliefs.  They used the same independent variables in regressions to 
estimate WTP.  While they show that people with protest beliefs behave differently in their WTP 
responses, they do not estimate separate models for protest and non-protest respondents.  Instead, 
their constructed protest index variable is used to indicate strength of protest, and variables that 
indicate motivations for protesting are included in regressions.  They find that most respondents 
who are willing to pay for the public good also hold protest beliefs, and that WTP is negatively 
correlated with the strength of protest belief.  However, the overall fit for their WTP models is 
quite weak.  If the underlying distributions for WTP are different for respondents with different 
protest reasons or strengths, then separate models, or allowing parameters to vary by protest 
belief, may have resulted in an improved fit, which is the approach used in this paper. 
Many authors including Dziegielewska and Mendelsohn (2007) discuss the difficulty in 
coming up with a standard protocol for identifying protest responses.  The problem may be that a 
protest response is not necessarily a discretely measured item.  It may be that protest beliefs are 
held in some form by most people and have some effect on WTP responses.  Therefore, we 
propose treating protesting (holding protest beliefs) and opposing (WTP < 0) a proposed public 
program as separate concepts, so as to systematically analyze their determinants and their 
impacts on WTP estimates.  In this framework, people with protest beliefs may or may not vote 
‘no’ to all bids and people may, without being protesters, answer ‘no’ to all dollar amounts 
because they believe the outcome would leave them worse off.  We assume those who have no 
value for the proposed policy (i.e. indifferent respondents or WTP = 0) to be included in the 
“non-opposer” (WTP ≥ 0) category. 
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The first set of analyses addresses on the factors that motivate people to protest and/or 
oppose the proposed program.  Multinomial logit regression results suggest that the sample is so 
diverse that a single model does not provide a good fit.  To generate more accurate predictions 
on the probabilities of protesting and opposing, a different model specification would be required 
for each subsample.  Second, to test whether people with protest beliefs have different 
underlying processes that determine WTP than those without protest beliefs, we estimate nested 
models for “protesters” and “non-protesters” as group, rather than treating protesting as a 
continuous variable as in Meyerhoff and Liebe (2006).  The statistical test suggests that the two 
groups of respondents have different WTP distributions.  The result also suggests that the use of 
standard protest belief follow-up questions can successfully identify subsets of respondents 
whose strength of belief is different enough to affect WTP distribution. 
Background, Survey Design, and Data 
This paper provides valuation estimates for preventative and restorative land management 
programs in the Great Basin that would arrest the accelerated wildfire cycle due to invasion of 
annual weeds.  The sagebrush steppe of the United States Great Basin occupies 100 million acres 
of western high desert, provides habitat for more than 300 species of wildlife, supports one of the 
nation’s fastest growing human populations, and is the primary forage base for the western 
livestock industry (Knick et al. 2003).  While these lands provide for less than 3 percent of the 
nation’s cattle and sheep feed, grazing is a key component of local rural economies and the 
cultural identity of the region (Hess and Holechek 1995).  This ecosystem is also severely 
ecologically stressed, with the Nature Conservancy recently ranking it as the third most 
endangered in the United States (Stein et al. 2000; Noss et al. 1995).  Half has been lost to 
invasive annual grasses, primarily cheatgrass (Bromus tectorum), which have altered fire regimes 
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in the region, causing an escalating cycle of increasingly severe and frequent wildfire (Whisenant 
1990; Miller and Tausch 2001).  Scientific evidence suggests that unless steps are taken to 
intervene, the accelerating cheatgrass/wildfire cycle will result in irreversible shifts in ecosystem 
dynamics that would compromise the ability of the land to support native wildlife and plants and 
affect the biological and economic stability of the Great Basin (BLM 1999, 2000; Pellant, 
Abbey, and Karl 2004; Young et al. 1987; Devine 1993).  This observation motivates our study 
on the valuation of Great Basin ecosystem protection. 
Data were collected through a 2005 mail survey of Nevada residents, using survey methods 
based on Dillman (2000).  Focus groups, questionnaire development and pretesting proceeded 
through spring and summer of 2005.  Responses were analyzed during one-on-one interviews 
with pretest respondents, during group sessions, and afterward by the researchers.  Question 
wording was reviewed for comprehension and interpretation.  These results are based on the 
resulting pilot survey and are part of a larger body of related survey work in the Great Basin. 
The questionnaire collected data necessary to estimate willingness to pay (WTP) for 
vegetation management programs to protect ecosystem-derived values.  Questions were asked 
about respondents’ demographic characteristics, how they benefit from Great Basin lands, their 
beliefs and attitudes regarding the effects of invasive annual grasses and wildfire on these lands, 
and value of land management practices that target invasive grasses and wildfire.  A private firm 
supplied 2,125 addresses for the survey.  One thousand addresses were generated to be 
representative of the state of Nevada overall, based on the 2000 census.  Since a high proportion 
of the state population is in the Las Vegas and Reno metropolitan areas (Clark and Washoe 
Counties), an additional 1,125 addresses were drawn from rural counties to perform analysis 
comparing rural and urban populations.  The first mailing was conducted during mid-October, 
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2005.  Follow-up postcards were sent out to non-respondents.  A second mailing to non-
respondents was implemented during the first week of February, 2006, after the holiday season.  
Of 2,125 surveys sent out, 178 were undeliverable (no forwarding addresses available) and 576 
completed surveys were returned for a statewide response rate of 30%.  Response rates tended to 
be higher in rural counties, so the county-weighted average (37%) is higher than the statewide 
average.  Eighteen surveys were eventually omitted from the valuation analysis because they 
included inconsistent responses (i.e. a ‘no’ to a bid amount that was lower than one with a ‘yes’ 
response from the same respondent). 
An experimental design included five survey versions, assigned randomly to participants, to 
measure effects of providing respondents with additional information, preemptive versus 
restoration treatment scenarios, and multiple contingent valuation bid formats (Table 1).  The 
contingent valuation question is presented in the context of one of two treatment scenarios.  The 
prevent loss (PL) scenario states that the numbers of wildfires in Nevada are expected to double 
over the next five years due to the continued spread of cheatgrass, increasing the risk of 
irreversibly losing lands that could support native vegetation.  In this case, the proposed 
vegetation management program would prevent a negative change from the status quo.  The 
obtain gain (OG) scenario states that the proposed vegetation management program would be 
restorative and thereby reduce the number of wildfires throughout Nevada by half (a positive 
change).  Thus the OG scenario measures willingness to pay to improve the status quo (obtain a 
positive change relative to the status quo).  The two versions of the program proposal are 
provided in an Appendix.  Both scenarios state that the program would be funded through a 
dedicated tax.  Respondents were asked how they would vote in a referendum to implement the 
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vegetation management program, if passage would cost each household a specific amount every 
year for the foreseeable future. 
Table 1.  Questionnaire Versions 
 
Version Information Treatment scenario Bid format Responses 
PLSi with Prevent loss (PL) $0, $1, and 1 other (S) 109 
PLDi with Prevent loss (PL) $0, $1, and 2 others (D) 84 
PLMi with Prevent loss (PL) $0, $1, and 7 others (M) 75 
OGMi with Obtain gain (OG) $0, $1, and 7 others (M) 104 
OGM without Obtain gain (OG) $0, $1, and 7 others (M) 186 
(Total)    558 
 
Respondents were presented with three to nine bid amounts.  Three discrete choice CVM 
formats were employed.  All versions included the bid amounts $0 and $1.  A “single-bid” (S) 
version included one additional randomly assigned bid amount from the bid set $12, $31, $52, 
$83, $114, $157, and $282.  The “double-bid” (D) version included two additional randomly 
assigned bid amounts from the same bid set.  The “multiple-bid” (M) version included all bid 
amounts, listed in ascending order.  The “no cost” ($0 bid) and the $1 bid amounts are included 
to separate those who are opposed to the proposed program and would vote against it even if it 
cost them nothing, from those who are in favor of the proposal but are unwilling or unable to pay 
for it.  Following Alberini et al (2003) and Welch and Poe (1998) all versions used 
polychotomous choice response options including ‘definitely no,’ ‘probably no,’ ‘probably yes,’ 
‘definitely yes,’ and ‘not sure,’ allowing respondents to indicate qualitative levels of 
uncertainty.1
We included with the survey a 2-page information sheet about cheatgrass, increasing wildfire 
suppression costs, the accelerating fire cycle and resulting irreversible ecosystem losses.  This 
information sheet was omitted from a sub-sample of the multiple-bid Obtain Gain versions 
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(OGM) in order to investigate the influence of information provision on WTP for fuel 
management programs. 
Table 2 summarizes demographic, and survey design variables generated from the data that 
are used in all models, as well as variables that indicate respondents’ perceptions of 1) the 
importance of specific resources and services provided by Nevada’s rangelands, 2) what 
threatens them, 3) what they believe management priorities should be, and 4) attitudes toward 
management methods. Descriptions and measurement units listed in Table 2 are self-explanatory. 
Identifying Protesters 
A battery of questions asking why respondents voted the way that they did to valuation 
proposals was included in the questionnaire to identify protest responses.  A protest response is 
defined as one motivated at least in part by attitudes that are not directly related to the good in 
question.  Respondents are coded as “protesters” if they checked any of the following four 
reasons for voting ‘no’ at least once to any dollar bid amount: “I don’t trust the government to 
use my taxes wisely,” “I already pay too much in taxes,” “I object to the way the question was 
asked,” or “I feel that I don’t have enough information.”  Opposition to the program is defined as 
not having answered ‘definitely yes’ to the $0 bid.  Because of the design of the polychotomous 
multiple question format, most respondents answered ‘no’ to at least one of the higher bid 
amounts, even if they had answered ‘yes’ to lower bid amounts.  This design resulted in a 
possibility of respondents who are “protester•non-opposers” who express protest beliefs but are 
willing to pay a non-negative amount. 
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Table 2.  Variables Describing Bid Responses, Demographics, and Survey Versions 
 
Variable Definition Mean St. Dev. 
Bid  Dollar amount presented to respondent 65.612 27.153
Vs  1 = single bid questionnaire version; 0 otherwise 0.195 0.397
Vd  1 = double bid questionnaire version; 0 otherwise 0.151 0.358
Vm 1 = multiple bid questionnaire version; 0 otherwise 0.654 0.476
OG  Scenario: 1 = restoration (obtain gain); 0 = prevent loss 0.520 0.500
Info 1 = information sheet provided; 0 = no information sheet 0.667 0.472
Income Household annual income in $1000’s 71.085 51.950
Age Age of respondent 52.135 14.356
Educ Number of years of schooling completed 14.254 2.469
Yrs_NV Number of years lived in Nevada 20.971 12.001
Job_ag 1 = ranching or agriculture; else = 0 0.075 0.264
Job_lndscp 1 = landscaping; else = 0 0.020 0.139
Job_mine 1 = mining; else = 0 0.152 0.360
Job_constr/mfn 1 = construction or manufacturing; else = 0 0.097 0.296
Job_trade 1 = wholesale or retail trade; else = 0 0.075 0.264
Job_wtrmgnt 1 = water resources management; else = 0 0.023 0.151
Job_othutil 1 = utilities (other than water); else = 0 0.034 0.182
Job_health 1 = healthcare; else = 0 0.088 0.283
Job_nrsci 1 = natural resource / environmental sciences; else = 0 0.036 0.186
Job_ed 1 = education/academia; else = 0 0.100 0.301
Job_ent 1 = arts, entertainment, hotel, food services; else = 0 0.048 0.215
Job_recr 1 = outdoor recreation & tourism; else = 0 0.043 0.203
Job_publnds 1 = public land management; else = 0 0.027 0.162
Job_admin 1 = public admin (not land & water resources); else = 0 0.016 0.126
Job_fire 1 = firefighting; else = 0 0.020 0.139
Srt 1= lives in small rural town; else = 0 0.373 0.484
Lrt 1= lives in large rural town; else = 0 0.140 0.347
Activity Number times engaged in activities on rangelands per year 1.744 1.320
Import_airwat Mean response to importance of air & water quality (1 to 4) 3.555 0.680
Threat_policy 1 = land use policies threaten rangelands; else = 0 0.610 0.488
Threat_wldhrse 1 = wild horses threaten Nevada’s rangelands; else = 0 0.410 0.492
Threat_nonnat 1 = seeding w/ non-natives threaten rangelands; else = 0 0.554 0.498
Pri_frpvt Importance of wildfire prevention as a mgmnt priority (1-4) 3.049 0.960
dmeth_herb 1 = Using herbicides not appropriate; else = 0 0.249 0.433
dmthd_nogrz 1 = Excluding grazing animals not appropriate; else = 0 0.405 0.491
dmthd_prsfir 1 = Prescribed fire not appropriate; else = 0 0.063 0.243
dmthd_prsgrz 1 = Prescribed grazing not appropriate; else = 0 0.061 0.240
dgrzveg 1 = Agree that livestock grazing should be managed for vegetation priorities; else = 0 0.762 0.426
dfiresupp 1 = Agree that rangeland fires should be stopped only when 0.448 0.498
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they threaten human life; 0 = otherwise 
 
Because only those who answered ‘no’ to any bid were asked to answer follow-up questions, 
protest attitudes of those who answered ‘yes’ to all bids could not be determined.  There were 35 
responses with ‘definitely yes’ to all bids, of which one answered the follow-up question and was 
coded as a protester.  The other 34 respondents were assigned a missing value for the protest 
dummy variable.  Of the 524 respondents with a value for the protest variable, 286 (55%) 
exhibited some protest beliefs (Table 3).  Distrust of government was the most popular reason for 
protest, followed by already paying too much in taxes and then by insufficient information.  
Proportionately more protesters are found among opposers than among non-opposers, but a 
substantial 51% of non-opposers are also protesters.  No clear pattern is observed for differences 
in protest reasons between opposers and non-opposers. 
Table 3.  Protesting and Opposing 
 
 Opposer 
(WTP < 0) 
Non-opposer
(WTP ≥ 0) 
Total 
Protester (‘yes’ to at least one question) 117 (60%) 169 (51%) 286 (55%) 
of which:     
I don’t trust the government 77 (66%) 116 (69%) 193 (67%) 
I already pay too much in taxes 64 (55%) 93 (55%) 157 (55%) 
I object to the way the question was asked 21 (18%) 21 (12%) 42 (15%) 
I don’t have enough information 57 (49%) 53 (31%) 110 (38%) 
     
Non-protester 77 (40%) 161 (49%) 238 (45%) 
Total 194 (100%) 330 (100%) 524 (100%)
 
We assume that protest attitudes are a characteristic of the individual that originates from his 
or her beliefs.  If any of the questionnaire design variables influenced a respondent’s propensity 
to be a protester, we would need to proceed with caution.  Of particular concern is whether 
demonstration of protest attitude was affected by whether respondents were given PL (prevent 
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losses) or OG (obtain gain) version of questionnaire.  Whether or not the additional 2-page 
information was offered also potentially affect propensity to express protest attitudes. 
To test for potential selection bias introduced by survey designs, probit regressions were run 
to estimate protest probabilities using questionnaire design variables as explanatory variables for 
appropriate subsamples.  The estimation results (not shown in table) indicate that whether a 
respondent received a PL or OG version or whether a respondent received additional information 
did not affect protest probability.  On the other hand, we found that the bid structure may have 
affected protest answers: a higher protest probability was observed among respondents with 
questionnaire that contained higher dollar bid amounts on average.  However, the effect was 
insignificant when the same model was run only for PL version recipients (the OG version 
contains no variation in bid structure).  Thus, it is likely that bid structure did not affect protest 
answers but, when PL and OG version respondents are pooled, the data tend to show some 
spurious relation.  This result will be accounted for in the subsequent analyses. 
Probabilities of Protesting and Opposing 
The next model predicts the probability a respondent will be one of the four types: 1) 
protester•opposer, 2) non-protester•opposer, 3) protester•non-opposer, and 4) non-protester•non-
opposer.  The model explores which individual characteristics are associated with protest beliefs 
and what motivates people to oppose or support programs to protect rangeland ecosystems.  A 
multinomial logit regression was applied to the dataset using the “non-protester•non-opposer” 
type as the base outcome.  In this model, observations with missing protest information were 
dropped. 
Non-opposers are defined as those individuals who answered ‘definitely yes’ to $0; that is, 
they are certain that they would support or be indifferent to the program if it would cost their 
 
 
12
household nothing.  If we define indifferent respondents as those who answered ‘definitely yes’ 
to $0 but not to $1 bid, there were 42 such respondents.  Non-opposers are assumed to be “in the 
market” for the proposed efforts to protect rangeland ecosystems in principle, but they may still 
hold protest beliefs. 
Any other response to $0 is assumed to indicate either a perceived utility loss from adoption 
of the proposed program or a protest response.  Some respondents may oppose because they 
expect to be negatively affected by certain features of a vegetation management program.  The 
description of the treatments include all of the methods currently being used in the Great Basin 
today for vegetation management, including herbicides that target invasive annuals, prescribed 
burning, grazing prohibitions, and planting non-native grasses that can out-compete invasive 
annuals more effectively than native species.  While all of these methods are used because they 
have been proven effective in a variety of circumstances, there are potential costs and risks 
associated with them as well.  We expect that respondents who believe that the expected net 
effect of a program to them personally would leave them worse off would indicate opposition to 
the program even if it cost them $0.  If these respondents did not indicate a protest reason for 
their answer, then we consider these as legitimate indications of negative WTP for the programs. 
Many of the demographic and attitudinal variables are collinear.  Thus, model selection 
focused on removing insignificant and collinear variables from the regression while keeping the 
variables we believe affect probabilities of protesting and opposing.  Regression results are 
summarized in Table 4, and their interpretations are the following.  Since the base outcome is 
non-protester•non-opposer, column (1) reveals variables that affect the probability of protesting 
and opposing simultaneously.  Column (2) represents how the explanatory variables affect non-
protester•opposer probability relative to non-protester•non-opposer probability, that is, they show 
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what makes an individual more likely to oppose when he or she is a non-protester.  Similarly, 
column (3) represents the effect of the variables on probability of protesting when an individual 
is a non-opposer.  Upon inspection of coefficients and standard errors, it appears that the 
underlying behavioral motivations for protesting and opposing are very different among the three 
groups (indicated by columns 1 through 3). 
Nevada’s population is such that residents who live in metropolitan areas tend to be less 
conservative than their rural counterparts.  Nevadans who live in rural towns and isolated rural 
areas tend to be much more conservative and less likely to trust government and support new 
government programs.  For these reasons, we might expect that the probability of being a 
protester would be higher for rural residents relative to the rest of the population.  On the other 
hand, we can surmise that respondents from large rural towns are more likely to live in 
communities most affected by exotic weed invasions and accelerating fire cycles.  For this 
reason, they may be more likely to understand the proposed vegetation management programs, 
how they work and how they may affect residents’ quality of life.  We can surmise that these 
respondents are more likely to respond to the specific features of the good in question (programs 
to affect accelerating fire cycles) rather than to their held beliefs about trust in government or tax 
rates.  As for opposition to the proposed programs, for the reasons outlined above, residents of 
large rural communities may be less likely to oppose such a program. 
Model results indicate that, relative to the base case, the probabilities of being a non-
protester•opposer (column 2) and protester•non-opposer (column 3) individually are lower for 
residents in large rural towns.  These results are consistent with our discussion above.  However, 
the coefficient for large rural town residence (Lrt) is not significant for the probability of being 
both an opposer and a protester (column 1).  The result suggests that the underlying motivations  
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 [Table 4.  Estimation Results for Probability of Protesting and Opposing (Multinomial 
Logit) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Protester 
Opposer 
Non-protester 
Opposer 
Protester 
Non-opposer 
         
 Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e. 
    
Educ -0.164*** 0.059  -0.173** 0.073  -0.119** 0.051 
Age 0.003 0.010  0.000 0.012  -0.016* 0.009 
Job_ag 1.148** 0.499  0.684 0.584  -0.208 0.546 
Job_trade 0.522 0.507  1.015* 0.536  -0.028 0.519 
Job_ed -0.387 0.524  -1.165 0.811  0.516 0.372 
Job_recr -1.261* 0.723  -0.605 0.676  -1.117* 0.623 
Srt 0.348 0.312  0.299 0.346  0.361 0.263 
Lrt 0.542 0.364  -1.032* 0.608  -0.661* 0.375 
Activity -0.259** 0.114  0.099 0.120  0.072 0.093 
Import_airwat -0.270 0.216  -0.035 0.273  -0.296 0.201 
Threat_policy -0.268 0.281  -0.351 0.342  0.289 0.254 
Threat_wldhrse 0.262 0.282  0.737** 0.332  0.017 0.246 
Threat_non-nat 0.071 0.280  -0.138 0.333  0.307 0.246 
Pri_frpvt -0.319** 0.144  0.056 0.181  -0.097 0.132 
dmthd_nogrz 0.253 0.276  -0.507 0.341  0.045 0.245 
dmthd_prsgrz 0.248 0.701  1.069 0.657  0.813 0.565 
dmthd_prsfir 1.021 0.622  0.337 0.769  0.639 0.598 
dmeth_herb -0.070 0.329  0.333 0.367  -0.289 0.292 
dgrzveg -0.901*** 0.332  -1.339*** 0.385  -0.762** 0.310 
dfiresupp 0.241 0.273  0.576* 0.325  0.129 0.241 
Vs -0.766 0.480  -1.080** 0.552  -1.058** 0.426 
Vd -0.835* 0.500  -1.486** 0.615  -0.917** 0.440 
OG  -0.478 0.487  -0.455 0.537  -0.283 0.414 
Info -0.619 0.392  -0.136 0.444  -0.370 0.330 
cons 5.124*** 1.440  2.628 1.768  4.527*** 1.304 
       
Log likelihood -600.257     
Observations 515     
Pseudo R2 0.116     
Notes: Significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively. 
Base outcome is non-protester•non-opposer. 
Observations with missing protest information are dropped. 
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 by large rural town residents for protest and opposition voting may be very different, so that 
the multinomial logit picks these up through the coefficients that isolate the individual effects but 
not when they are combined. 
We can surmise that Nevada residents involved in agriculture are likely to be aware that 
vegetation management treatments associated with rangeland restoration and prevention of 
exotic weed invasion typically involve livestock grazing prohibitions that can have negative 
effects on ranching income.  They are thus more likely to be opposers.  If it can be assumed that 
ranchers follow similar demographic patterns to others living in rural Nevada, we would expect 
these respondents to be more conservative and more likely to hold protestor beliefs regarding 
government distrust and taxation.  As expected, column (1) indicates that individuals involved in 
agriculture (Job_ag) are more likely to protest and oppose.  However, its individual effects on 
protesting or opposing alone are not significant (columns 2 and 3). 
Not surprisingly, the probability of falling into any of the three groups, relative to the base 
case, is negatively associated with education level (Educ) and agreement with the statement that 
grazing should be managed for vegetation management priorities (dgrzveg).  These variables are 
statistically significant across all groups.  Other variables seem to have differential effects on 
protest and opposition probabilities.  Those who engage more in outdoor activities (Activity) and 
those who consider fire prevention as a priority (Pri_firpvt) are less likely to protest or oppose 
the proposed land management programs (column 1).  Employment in retail or wholesale trade 
(Job_trade), the degree to which individuals believe wildhorses are a serious threat to rangelands 
(Threat_wldhrse), and agreement with the statement that rangeland fires should be stopped only 
when they threaten human life (dfiresupp) are positively and significantly associated with non-
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protester’s probability of opposing (column 2).  These variables likely reflect underlying 
conflicts of respondents’ personal interests with the proposed program so that, while not 
revealing protest beliefs, they are unwilling to pay for the program.  In column (3) the negative 
coefficient on Age suggests that a non-opposer’s probability of protesting decreases with age.  
Employment in outdoor recreation and tourism (Job_recr) is negatively associated with the 
probability of protesting for both opposers and non-opposers (columns 1 and 3). 
Finally, in general, survey design variables (Vs, Vd, OG, and Info) all have a negative effect 
on the probabilities of being in any of the three categories in Table 4.  Relative to the multiple-
bounded versions (with 9 bid amounts presented), respondents with single or double bid versions 
are less likely to oppose and protest.  The effects from information provision (Info) and the 
restoration version of the program (OG) are not significant, but the signs are persistently 
negative on these coefficients.  However, the coefficients on Vs and Vd likely reflect the spurious 
relation between bid design and protest probability discussed in the previous section. 
Overall, the multinomial logit results indicate that there are likely complex behavioral 
motivations underlying the probabilities of being a protestor•opposer, a non-protestor•opposer, a 
protester•non-opposer, and a non-protester•non-opposer.  Different behavioral motivations may 
carry through to different underlying distributions for WTP so that estimation of WTP without 
testing for these differences would result in the wrong model.  Moreover, the low pseudo R2 
value (0.116) for the multinomial logit suggests that this model does not possess the predictive 
power on protest/oppose probabilities that policy decision makers would like.  For more accurate 
probability predictions, it is desirable to fit different conditional models for protesters, non-
protesters, opposers, and non-opposers.  For the purpose of the present paper, however, we point 
out that conventional treatment of protester responses in willingness to pay estimation – 
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dropping groups (1) and (2) and pooling the rest – may be overly simplistic, and lead to loss of 
information.  We accommodate for these differences in estimation of WTP for the programs. 
Willingness to Pay Estimation 
Respondents who voted ‘definitely yes’ to support the program at zero cost were retained to 
use in the valuation models to estimate WTP for the proposed programs to protect rangeland 
ecosystems.  In doing so, we measure conditional WTP (WTP|WTP ≥ 0).  A random effects 
probit was used to determine the probability of a ‘yes’ response, as described in Rollins et al. 
(2008) and Boxall et al. (2003).  An unbalanced panel was created with one observation per bid 
amount for each individual.  Thus, each respondent is represented by three to nine observations. 
The overall model selection strategy was to include as many variables that are observable and 
easily identifiable to policy makers as possible.  This called for inclusion of more demographic 
than attitudinal variables.  Preliminary models (not presented here) showed that most attitudinal 
variables had minimal effect on WTP estimates; the estimated WTP levels were extremely robust 
to the choice of attitudinal variables to include in the model.  Thus, we focus on demographic 
and survey design variables that were included to test for robustness of WTP estimation.  First, a 
pooled model was used to perform a Chi-square test to determine whether protest and non-
protest models are statistically different.2  The regression coefficients of our predictor variables 
are constrained to be the same for protestors and non-protestors against unconstrained models.  
The likelihood ratio chi-square test shows that the unconstrained models provide a significantly 
better fit to the data (Table 5).  The important implication is that the processes generating WTP 
are different for protestors and non-protestors, so generalization to the population as a whole 
cannot take place unless both group processes have been modeled. 
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Table 5.  Results of Likelihood-Ratio Test 
 
Sample Log likelihood 
Pooleda -712.253 
Protesters -287.697 
Non-protestersa -349.351 
  
LR Chi2 (26) 144.26 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 
a Observations with missing protest information are included. 
 
 
The model was then estimated for the pooled sample, protester subsample, and non-protester 
subsample (Table 6).  In models (4) and (6), the observations with missing protest information 
were included as non-protesters.  Because these observations were the only ones with ‘yes’ votes 
to the highest bid ($282), omitting them from WTP estimation would result in a downward bias 
in the estimates.  Thus, we consider that model (6) gives the most reliable estimates of WTP for 
the proposed rangeland protection programs.  Note that model (4) would arise as the only WTP 
model if the conventional protest definition was applied (a ‘no’ response to all bid levels and a 
protest response indicated). 
As expected, the mean WTP estimate for protesters ($34.02) indicated in model (5) is 
substantially lower than that of model (6) for the non-protesters ($69.56).  The explanatory 
power of the independent variables on WTP for protestors is low; other than the bid amount and 
income, none are statistically significant.  We conjecture that those who expressed protest beliefs 
likely evaluated, rather than a pure valuation of the ecosystem goods and services protected by 
the proposed programs, a composite good that included program delivery by government, 
funding via taxation, and other additional elements with negative connotations.  The poor fit of 
model (5) may indicate the necessity of alternative specifications that address these factors.  The  
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Table 6.  Estimation Results for WTP model (Random Effects Probit) 
 
 (4) (5) (6) 
 Pooleda Protester Non-protestera
 Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e. 
         
Bid -0.104*** 0.016  -0.108*** 0.019  -0.102*** 0.013 
Income 0.030*** 0.008  0.012* 0.006  0.051*** 0.013 
Age 0.181 0.132  -0.064 0.112  0.465** 0.201 
Age2 -0.002 0.001  0.001 0.001  -0.005** 0.002 
Yrs_NV 0.034 0.028  0.012 0.024  -0.049 0.041 
Job_ag 1.007 1.496  -2.450 1.565  2.137 2.093 
Job_lndscp -4.665* 2.599  -3.441 2.698  -4.113 3.871 
Job_mine -0.956 0.865  -0.207 0.766  -1.494 1.294 
Job_constr/mfn -0.059 1.161  0.372 0.916  1.671 1.530 
Job_trade 2.722* 1.443  -0.422 1.399  6.768*** 2.403 
Job_wtrmgnt 0.622 2.391  1.872 2.428  3.793 3.936 
Job_othutil -2.839* 1.665  -0.157 1.122  -9.512*** 3.387 
Job_health -0.131 1.181  0.948 0.942  -1.557 2.223 
Job_nrsci -1.993 1.972  2.559 1.791  -6.799*** 2.388 
Job_ed -0.165 0.930  0.984 0.827  -1.303 1.321 
Job_ent 1.013 1.468  1.119 1.244  0.558 1.968 
Job_recr 3.171* 1.844  1.014 1.875  3.393 2.197 
Job_publnds 2.325 2.521     2.244 3.352 
Job_admin 0.130 1.857  3.363 2.136  -5.428** 2.470 
Job_fire -0.331 1.910  -0.364 1.707  1.675 3.896 
Lrt -1.229 0.938  -1.091 0.957  -2.588* 1.383 
dmthd_prsgrz 1.387 1.508  0.217 1.002  6.676** 2.757 
Vs -0.601 1.144  -0.677 1.075  -2.398 1.821 
Vd -1.016 1.317  -0.321 1.040  -3.814** 1.905 
OG -0.995 1.167  -0.061 0.888  -4.859** 2.084 
Info 0.024 0.926  0.087 0.723  -1.478 1.521 
cons -1.074 3.378  2.695 2.870  -0.594 5.306 
         
WTP mean (s.e.) 54.828 (1.253)  34.020 (1.020)  75.704 (3.167)
WTP median 52.782   33.751   69.561  
95% CI (52.363, 57.293)  (32.005, 36.035)  (69.451, 81.956) 
K&R 95% CIb (48.76, 61.60)  (29.12, 39.29)  (67.00, 84.16) 
         
Log likelihood -711.885  -287.697  -349.148 
Observations 2281   1157   1124  
Respondents 325   153   172  
Rho 0.968 0.010  0.894 0.038  0.975 0.007 
a Observations with missing protest information are included. 
b Krinsky and Robb Confidence Intervals estimated using a Stata routine developed by Jeanty (2007). 
Notes:  Significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 are denoted by three, two, and one asterisks (***, **, *), respectively. 
Job_publnds is dropped in model (5) due to collinearity. 
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model under the conventional protest definition, model (4), also understates ($54.82) the pure 
valuation of the ecosystem services to be protected. 
Model (6), WTP for non-protesters, indicates that the probability of a ‘yes’ response is 
decreasing in the bid amount and increasing in income, as expected.  WTP is increasing with age 
until age 49, after which it is decreasing.  People who received the version of the questionnaire 
with the restoration policy (OG) were less likely to vote ‘yes’ than those with the preservation 
policy (PL).  This is consistent with previous research that suggests people tend to be willing to 
pay more to protect the status quo than they are to obtain a gain to the status quo.  This result 
may be important to consider more carefully in further work, since it would imply that the longer 
policy-makers wait to implement policies to protect ecosystem services, there will be lower 
public support for restoring additional degradation that might occur. 
People who believe that prescribed grazing is not an appropriate tool for rangeland 
management (dmthd_prsgrz) were more likely to vote ‘yes.’  Prescribed grazing was listed as 
one of the ten means by which the proposed programs would reduce the spread of invasive 
species and reduce wildfire frequency.  However, prescribed grazing is controversial among 
those who are generally skeptical of private ranching on public lands in the Great Basin.  Thus, 
the positive coefficients on dmthd_prsgrz may imply that those who are opposed to prescribed 
grazing as a management method are willing to pay more to prevent ecosystem losses through 
the other methods.  This result also has direct policy relevance, as the choice of rangeland 
management methods is a significant concern for the public land management authority. 
While Table 4 results indicate that a respondent from a large rural town (Lrt) is less likely to 
be a protester or an opposer, a non-protester•non-opposer from a large rural town tends to have a 
lower WTP than the rest of the population (Table 6, model 6).  The result confirms that the four 
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groups used in the multinomial logit are indeed very different and that separate models are 
warranted.  Variable Lrt does not significantly affect protestors’ WTP. 
The probability of voting ‘yes’ is positively associated with employment in wholesale or 
retail trade (Job_trade) but negatively associated with employment in utilities other than water 
(Job_othutil), natural resource and environmental sciences (Job_nrsci), and public 
administration (Job_admin).  These results may be associated with potential impacts of the 
proposed policy on the regional economy through linkage effects across sectors. 
Of the design variables other than OG, the additional information supplied (Info) did not 
appear to affect the probability of a ‘yes’ response, nor was the effect of a single-bid amount (Vs) 
relative to the multiple-bid amount (Vm) versions.  However, relative to the respondents who 
received the multiple-bid versions (Vm), the double version (Vd) appears to have a negative 
influence on WTP.  However, upon further investigation, these latter effects are spurious and 
were inadvertently generated as a result of the experimental design described in Table 13. 
Conclusions 
The willingness to pay estimation for protest respondents revealed that they do value 
ecosystem services that would be protected under the proposed programs in this study.  
However, the estimated WTP levels were substantially lower for protesters than for non-
protesters.  In the case of programs to protect flows of ecological goods and services from 
Nevada’s rangelands, the fact that over 86% of these lands are in public ownership makes it 
difficult to suggest a credible stated-preference payment vehicle and policy-delivery mechanism 
that does not include public sector involvement.  The policies would necessarily be implemented 
by public agencies and methods would comply with federal government regulatory requirements.  
We expect that the general population from which the sample is drawn is well aware of this.  For 
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protester respondents, the good being valued may include features that are inseparable from the 
policy implementation and the payment vehicle, both in the stated preference questionnaire as 
well as in their understanding of the good as it exists in reality. 
When the reality of the proposed policy is reflected in the stated preference payment vehicle 
and policy implementation mechanism, we find it less compelling to treat traditional protest 
beliefs as indicative of an outlier.  Instead, we consider the possibility that in these cases a 
protest belief is a legitimate part of individuals’ preferences and influences their understanding 
of the definition of the good at hand.  However, under these conditions, the data may represent 
different definitions of the good being valued, and therefore different distributions for WTP. 
To generalize beyond the current study, under what circumstances are the protest beliefs a 
genuine reflection of the definition of the good as that portion of the population understand it?  If 
the components of a proposed policy that trigger protest beliefs are integral to the good as it 
enters an individual’s utility function, then it is difficult to separate what part of WTP for 
protesters is their valuation of ecosystem goods, and what part is due to how these ecosystems 
are managed in order to provide flows of benefits.  In cases like these, we suggest that both sets 
of estimates, those for protestors and non-protestors, are informative for policy makers. 
For many environmental goods, policy contexts are integral to people’s values for these 
goods.  Other circumstances in which environmental goods and the existing policy mechanisms 
to deliver them are not separable include the impacts of global environmental goods for which 
collective action is required to produce a desired public good benefit.  Further work might 
investigate whether it is possible to develop stated preference models in which structural 
interactions between the environmental good and the mechanisms for its delivery and payment 
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can be explicitly modeled, where these mechanisms are likely to be highly correlated with 
pervasive protest beliefs. 
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Appendix:  Two Versions of Proposal 
 
A. Proposal PL (Prevent Loss) 
 
PROPOSAL 
 
Suppose that experts predict the numbers of wildfires in Nevada to double over the next 
five years due to the continued spread of cheatgrass.  This will lead to the loss of native 
grasses, wildflowers, and shrubs.   
 
A new, intensive Rangeland Vegetation Management Program has been proposed.  This 
program will reduce fire risk by reducing cheatgrass through the use of prescribed fires, 
machinery, herbicides, prescribed grazing, and seeding with native plants and non-native 
grasses such as crested wheatgrass. 
 
Under this new program, fire risk would not double, but stay the same as it is now.   
 
Now suppose that the Rangeland Vegetation Management Program would be funded 
through a new tax.  
 
If a majority voted YES (for the proposal), a special tax would be collected from everyone 
and used only for the Rangeland Vegetation Management Program.   
 
If a majority voted NO (against the proposal), the tax would not be charged and the 
management program would not be funded. 
 
Please imagine that if the proposal passes, you would be charged the special tax every year 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
As you think about your answer, please remember that if this proposal passes, you would 
have less money for other expenses.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Proposal OG (Obtain Gain) 
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PROPOSAL 
 
Suppose that a new, intensive Rangeland Vegetation Management Program has been 
proposed.  This program will reduce fire risk by reducing cheatgrass through the use of 
prescribed fires, machinery, herbicides, prescribed grazing, and seeding with native plants 
and non-native grasses such as crested wheatgrass. 
 
The new program could reduce the number of wildfires throughout the state by half. 
  
Now suppose that the Rangeland Vegetation Management Program would be funded 
through a new tax.  
 
If a majority voted YES (for the proposal), a special tax would be collected from everyone 
and used only for the Rangeland Vegetation Management Program.   
 
If a majority voted NO (against the proposal), the tax would not be charged and the 
management program would not be funded. 
 
Please imagine that if the proposal passes, you would be charged the special tax every year 
for the foreseeable future. 
 
As you think about your answer, please remember that if this proposal passes, you would 
have less money for other expenses.
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Notes
                                                 
1 An analysis of respondents’ uncertainty about answers is forthcoming. 
2 Those observations with missing protest information were included as non-protesters.  Note 
that these are the respondents who answered ‘definitely yes’ to all bid amounts. 
3 Running the same models with only prevent loss (PL) policy versions indicated extremely high 
P-values for the Vs and Vd coefficients.  There is no bid structure variation for obtain gain (OG) 
version.  Running the model for both policy versions but without the Vs and Vd variables 
indicates that the coefficient on OG remains significant and negative.  Therefore, we attribute the 
significance of Vd to the spurious correlation coming through the survey design, for which we 
have been unable to control. 
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